The suppression of the Brooks-Bhagat report on the war with China is a betrayal of Nehru’s promise to the nation
The Government of India’s statement in Parliament on May 10, that the
Report of the Operations Review Committee on the 1962 War with China, by
Lt.Gen. T.B. Henderson Brooks and Brigadier P.S. Bhagat, V.C., will not
be published follows an Order of March 19, 2009 by a Bench of the
Central Information Commission comprising the Chief Information
Commissioner, Wajahat Habibullah, and the Information Commissioner, M.L.
Sharma on Kuldip Nayar’s application for a copy of the Report.
The Central Public Information Officer (CPIO) had replied to him on June
13, 2008 quoting S. 8(1) (a) of the RTI which reads thus:
“‘Notwithstanding anything contained in this act, there shall be no
obligation to give any citizen information, disclosure of which would
prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the
security, strategic, scientific or economic interests of the State,
relation with foreign State or lead to incitement of an offence.’ Since
the report contained information, which was considered sensitive
therefore, same, was regretted.” The vague word “sensitive” does not
figure in S. 8.
Bearing on security
The CIC’s Order quoted S. 8(2) but did not act on it: “Notwithstanding
anything in the Official Secrets Act, 1923, or any of the exemptions
permissible in accordance with sub-section (1), a public authority may
allow access to information, if public interest in disclosure outweighs
the harm to the protected interests.” The CIC examined the Original
Report, including the pages of conclusions at pp. 192-222. The Ministry
of Defence (MoD) had told the CIC that the Report “was a part of
internal review conducted on the orders of the then Chief of Army Staff,
Gen. Choudhary. Reports of internal review are not even submitted to
Govt. let alone placed in the public domain. Disclosure of this
information will amount to disclosure of the army’s operational strategy
in the North-East and the discussion on deployments had a direct
bearing on the question of the Line of Actual Control between India and
China, a live issue examination between the two countries at present.”
The Director General Military Operations, therefore, submitted that the
report falls clearly within the exemption of disclosures laid down in
Sec. 8(1)(a) of the RTI act read with sec. 8(3).”
The CIC’s Order said: “We have examined the report specifically in terms
of its bearing on present national security. There is no doubt that the
issue of the India-China Border particularly along the North East parts
of India is still a live issue with ongoing negotiations between the
two countries on this matter. The disclosure of information of which the
Henderson Brooks report carries considerable detail on what
precipitated the war of 1962 between India and China will seriously
compromise both security and the relationship between India and China,
thus having a bearing both on internal and external security. We have
examined the report from the point of view of severability u/s 10(1).
For reasons that we consider unwise to discuss in this Decision Notice,
this Division Bench agrees that no part of the report might at this
stage be disclosed.”
Both the MoD and the CIC confused diplomatic embarrassment in “ongoing
negotiations” with China with “national security” and concluded that
material on “what precipitated the war … will seriously compromise both
security and the relationship between India and China.” The CIC
concludes from this: “thus having a bearing both on internal and
external security.” Books galore have been published in India and abroad
on who and what triggered the war without affecting either our
“security” or the relationship with China.
The report
Are we sure China does not have a copy of the Report? Most certainly Neville Maxwell has. His book, “India’s China War” (1970),
drew on “Material from unpublished files and reports of the Government
of India and the Indian Army.” It was a veiled reference to the
Henderson Brooks Report. This writer acquired personal knowledge of the
fact.
China Quarterly (London) published in its July-September 1970
issue a review-article by this writer on India’s Forward Policy based on
the memoirs of Brig. John P. Dalvi, “Himalayan Blunder,” Lt. Gen. B.M. Kaul’s “The Untold Story,” and D.R. Mankekar’s “The Guilty Men of 1962.” Maxwell
wrote a lengthy reply to it which the editor, David C. Wilson, sent
across for this writer’s rejoinder. In three of the footnotes, the
Henderson Brooks report was cited with full references. The writer’s
reply explicitly asserted that Maxwell had made his comments party “on
the basis of the Henderson Brooks report from which his information is
drawn and which is not available to me.” Both the reply and the
rejoinder were published together in China Quarterly of
January-March 1971. But, instead of the explicit and precise references
to the report in the footnotes in the proof, Maxwell’s reply, as
published, referred to “an unpublished document.”
On April 14, 2001, the Economic and Political Weekly published
Maxwell’s article entitled “Henderson Brooks Report: An Introduction.”
What he wrote knocks the CIC’s order for a six and exposes the falsity
of the government’s excuses. “The Henderson Brooks Report is long (its
main section, excluding recommendations and many annexures, covers
nearly 200 foolscap pages).” He quotes directly from the Report which
said: “It would have been convenient and logical to trace the events
(beginning with) Army HQ, and then move down to Commands for more
details … ending with field formations for the battle itself.”
Maxwell’s comments on the Report are noteworthy. “The report includes no
surprises, and its publication would be of little significance but for
the fact that so many in India still cling to the soothing fantasy of a
1962 Chinese aggression… Even in the dry, numbered paragraphs of their
report, HB/B’s account of the moves that preceded the final assault is
dramatic and riveting.” Its main author was one of the most
distinguished soldiers we have known, Brigadier Prem Bhagat, holder of a
WWII Victoria Cross, who Maxwell describes as “a no-nonsense, fighting
soldier, widely respected in the Army,” going on to say that “the taut,
unforgiving analysis in the report bespeaks the asperity of his
reproach” — that explains its suppression. It is a damning document.
Henderson Brooks settled down in Australia after retirement. On March
19, 2009, the CIC made its Order apparently unaware of this revealing
article published on April 14, 2001. If Maxwell were to put the report
online, no red faces will be noticed in South Block. They will be
covered with egg.
The suppression is a betrayal of a solemn promise to the nation. On
November 9, 1962, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru solemnly promised the
Rajya Sabha: “People have been shocked, all of us have been shocked, by
the events that occurred from October 20 onwards, especially of the
first few days, and the reverses we suffered. So I hope there will be an
inquiry so as to find out what mistakes or errors were committed and
who were responsible for them.”
The inquiry, though conducted internally, was intended to allay public
disquiet and to fix responsibility. On September 2, 1963, Raksha Mantri
Y.B. Chavan informed Parliament about the Report claiming “this inquiry
is the type of inquiry which the Prime Minister had in mind when he
promised such an inquiry to the House in November 1962.” But
“publication of this report which contains information about the
strength and deployment of our forces and their locations would be of
invaluable use to our enemies. It would not only endanger our security
but affect the morale of those entrusted with safeguarding the security
of our borders.” In 1963 this was understandable. In 2009 it was not. He
made a tantalising reference to “the higher direction of operation.
Even the largest and the best equipped of armies need to be given proper
policy guidance” — the leadership’s role.
What CIC Wajahat Habibullah said in a press interview on August 24,
2010, provides the clues: “The Report reveals the incompetence of the
military top brass. But that was not why we rejected the plea for its
disclosure. [We] felt that the Report hinged on the questions which are
still items of negotiation between India and China.”
This is no ground at all. The issue is not the alignment of the McMahon
Line but China’s claim to Arunachal Pradesh. But the alignment is
relevant to “what precipitated the war of 1962,” as his order puts it.
That is known to all. On September 12, 1959, Nehru candidly told
Parliament that in “some parts” the McMahon Line “was not considered a
good line and it was varied afterwards by us.” In June 1962, the Dhola
Post was set up within that line but beyond the map line — an area of 60
sq.miles. On September 8, Chinese troops took up positions dominating
it. Responding to public anger, Nehru ordered their eviction. China
replied with a massive attack on October 20. Maj.Gen. Niranjan Prasad
who commanded the 4 Division at Tezpur had doubts about the Line in that
area.
Inquiries in other countries
The CIC’s Order, based on unreal fears inspired by patriotic fervour,
flies in the face of a record of such inquiries in democracies.
In Britain: 1. It defeated Russia in the Crimean War (1853-6) but the
heavy cost prompted an inquiry 2. A Royal Commission inquired “into the
Dardanalles operations.” Its Report was debated in the House of Commons
on March 20, 1917, while WWI was on. 3. The Franks Committee inquired
into the Falklands War of April 1982. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
and three predecessors gave oral evidence. The Report was published in
January 1983. 4. The Butler Report on the Iraq invasion was followed by
Lord Chilcot’s inquiry which is still at work.
In the United States: 1. The Senate Armed Forces and Foreign Relations
Committees jointly inquired into Truman’s foreign and defence policies
in May-June 1952 after he sacked Gen. Douglas MacArthur while the war
was on. Top officials were grilled. 2. Defence Secretary Robert McNamara
set up on June 17, 1967, the Vietnam Study Task Force. Its Report ran
into 47 volumes known as the Pentagon Papers. Copied illegally, they
were published by The New York Times on June 13, 1971, during the
war. The Supreme Court upheld the paper’s right to publish them.
Justice Hugo Black’s remarks are relevant to our case. “The guarding of
military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed
representative government provides no security.” 3. Congressional
Reports on the 9/11 attack are public documents.
In Israel: 1. It set up a Commission of inquiry, headed by Chief Justice
Yitzhak Kahan into the killings in Palestinian Camps in Sabra and
Shatila in Beirut in September 1982. 2. A Commission of inquiry by the
President of the Supreme Court, Shimon Agranat, inquired into the Yom
Kippur War of 1973. Its Report was published after 20 years, but
published all the same. 3. Judge Eliyahu Winograd’s Commission censured
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and top army brass in its Report on April 30,
2007, for launching the Second Lebanese War in 2006. Heads had rolled
after all these probes — Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan, Ariel Sharon, Menachem
Begin. 4. The State Comptroller, Micha Lindenstrauss, a watchdog,
censured Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in June this year for
mishandling the 2010 raid on a flotilla in May 2010.
Does the Indian citizen deserve less?
(A.G. Noorani is a lawyer, author and commentator. His latest book, Article 370: A Constitutional History of Jammu and Kashmir, was published by Oxford University Press in 2011.)
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