Radical Islamists are waiting to rush into the vacuum that will be created by Assad’s fall
The end game in Syria has commenced. The king has lost several of his
pieces and is cornered, with little prospects of escape and win. The
best he can aspire to is an honourable draw and even that would appear
to be too much to hope for. The alternatives for the king or the
President are: offer a draw which means exile to another country or
fight till the bitter end.
Complete surrender
The western powers and their allies in the region have made their
intentions clear: they will not settle for anything less than complete
surrender and perhaps a trial for crimes against humanity either in
Damascus or in the International Criminal Court.
It has been known all
along — and this writer has mentioned it frequently — that the real
target was Iran. This has been confirmed by the latest reports of the
Americans consulting Israel about the post-Assad scenario. Israel would
appear to be willing and prepared to live alongside a radical, Muslim
Brotherhood-al Qaeda regime next door, so long as Iran loses its most
influential ally in the region; it still will have Iraq as an ally.
The course of the conflict over the past 18 months has raised serious
doubts about whether all those who instigated, financed and equipped the
rebels were ever ready to countenance a compromise, whereby Mr. Assad
would survive in office in return for implementing his promises of
reforms. That would have kept the Damascus-Tehran relationship intact
and, hence, was not acceptable.
Is it too late to try for a “political” solution? Is it worth
considering a formula whereby all the parties — rebels, principal
stakeholders which would include Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar and others,
P-5, Iran, the U.N. the Arab League, etc. — are brought together
face-to-face with Mr. Assad or his deputy in an effort to hammer out a
compromise? Keeping Iran out at Geneva was clearly evidence enough that a
peaceful, political settlement was not a priority. Perhaps, the
anti-regime players, by announcing at the very beginning of the revolt
that Mr. Assad had to go, made the ostensible search for a political
solution unconvincing.
Mr. Assad will certainly keep fighting till the bitter end; he might
think he will succeed in defeating the combined might of the rebels, who
by now are better organised and armed, and their backers who have
announced publicly that they intend to increase their assistance to the
rebels. It is open war. Mr. Assad surely knows the odds against him but
he might prefer to go down fighting rather than face a Qadhafi-like end.
He still has considerable stocks of conventional and chemical weapons
as well as missiles. The Hezbollah in Lebanon has thousands of missiles
aimed at Israel and Hassan Nasrallah has pledged support to Mr. Assad.
Iran, which has more stake than any other country in the regime’s
survival, will go to any length to support him, by itself and with Iraq
where Malliki is openly supportive of the Assad government due to
sectoral affinity. So, more, much more violence should be expected, with
the war spilling over to the neighbourhood.
Who will benefit from all that violence? Surely not the people of Syria
in whose name the fight is being fought! Radical Islamic elements will
be the only beneficiaries. Is this what the international community
wants? From all accounts, the sanctions imposed by America and Europe
are badly hurting the Iranian regime and Iranian people. Iran will be
further weakened but it might also unite the Iranian people behind the
regime more. If the desire to avoid further bloodshed is genuine, it
might still not be too late to consider something along the lines of the
suggestion mentioned in the previous paragraph.
There are some principles involved in the Syrian civil war. The principle which Russia and China cite for their otherwise realpolitik motivated
position is that any regime change must happen solely as a result of an
agreement among the people of the country and outsiders should have no
say in it. Russia insists that it is not holding any brief for Mr.
Assad, but says equally firmly that the principle is important. The
Libyan case is still fresh in the minds of everyone and is definitely a
factor in the general reluctance to support the increasingly loud demand
for the President to abdicate.
But the situation in Syria also touches on at least two other
principles. One has to do with the sanctity of human life and the other
concerns national interest. The almost daily massacres of scores of
people do pose a challenge to individual and collective conscience: can
one remain silent in the face of such events? Of course, since the world
is fed exclusively by the western media, one gets the impression that
the regime alone is responsible for all the mayhem, which is not the
case at all. We are told frequently by the U.N. sources that “armed
groups” are equally engaged in the killing sprees. Kofi Annan is careful
in demanding that “both sides” stop the violence. Nevertheless, since
the regime is far better equipped in terms of lethal weapons, even as
the opposition is getting more and more deadly arms from various, known
sources, the onus is particularly heavy on the regime. While condemning
the bloody violence in the country, there is no need to strike a balance
between the two sides. The regime will have to be singled out as more
responsible, just as we are more critical of the Israeli government for
the disproportionate use of force in retaliating against Palestinian
attacks.
The principle of national interest has two aspects: the forces of
history argument and hard national interest. It is best when the two
converge as they do in the Syrian case. It is good to be on the right
side of history, though it is not always evident what the right side
might be in every situation. It is more important to be on the winning
side and there is little doubt about who the winning side will be. So
many countries have invested so much in this conflict that they simply
cannot afford to fail or back out. It is only a matter of time before
the new President of Egypt, Morsi, comes out on the side of the Syrian
opposition. He recently went to Saudi Arabia where he was offered
significant aid and whose king would have certainly asked him to join in
the battle or war to protect fellow Sunnis in Syria.
It made good sense for India to have voted in favour of the resolution
that was vetoed by Russia and China. Of course, we would have felt
‘good’ to have abstained, but more important than feeling good is to
think of what is good for us. Our interests go beyond Syria since we
have enormous stake in the stability of the whole region — energy, six
million strong Indian workers, their remittances back home, to name a
few. Syria’s neighbours, determined as they are to get rid of Mr. Assad,
will certainly not forget who their friends were at the time of their
need. Kuwaitis have still not forgotten India’s ambivalent position at
the time of Saddam Hussein’s attempt to swallow their country in 1990,
though it has not come in the way of healthy relations with India (which
is partly at least a factor of our improved relations with Saudi
Arabia).
Other countries are not so large hearted as India is; we did not harbour
any grudge against all those countries that did not support us either
at the time of Chinese aggression in 1962 or at the time of our crisis
over Bangladesh in 1971.
Secular regime
Whatever else one might say about the Ba’ath regime, it was secular. It
did not persecute anyone on the ground of being a Sunni or any other
sect, except of course members of Muslim Brotherhood. The international
community ought to be, but does not seem to be, concerned at the fate
that would await the minorities in post-Assad Syria. Hardly a murmur is
heard in the western media on this. The concern is genuine. The Muslim
Brotherhood, the way it has been dealt with by the two Assad regimes,
will surely wreak vengeance when the opportunity presents itself. This
is already happening and will greatly escalate in future.
Sadly, one has not heard any reassuring voice from the opposition groups
in this regard. Their sponsors should advise them to do so. It is not
enough to include this sentiment in declarations drafted by “friends of
Syria.” ‘After Assad, what?’ is a question that should engage the
attention of all those who are single-mindedly bent on getting rid of
him, not so much in terms of who will take over power as in terms of
what awaits the minority communities in Syria. How will the U.N.
guarantee protection to them? Surely, the international community must
live up to its responsibility to ensure their safety. It would be
appropriate for India to highlight this aspect.
(The author, a former Permanent Representative of India at the United Nations, is a commentator on international affairs.)
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